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Evaluate the Effect of IMF’s Longer-Term Concessional Lending Programs on
Growth in the Development Background of Sub-Saharan Region
Abstract
Despite different voices from critics, the IMF has put development at the center of its policies. This paper
tries to separate the effect of SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and ECF on growth empirically. Selecting a sample of 44
countries in the Sub-Saharan region from 1986 to 2011, it analyzes whether the IMF’s longer-term
structural adjustment programs influences economic growth in participating countries. Consistent with
previous studies, this research shows that SAF and ESAF have statistically insignificant impact on growth
in the short term and long term. PRGF and ECF, on the other hand, are found to have a large and strong
positive correlation with growth rate in the short run, and immaterial impact in the long run. Results also
show that the structural adjustment programs not only offer impact through loan disbursement, but more
through the catalytic effect that goes along with the loan. The overall result provides evidence that the
“streamlining” revolution of the IMF in providing structural adjustment advice has shown optimistic effect
in Sub-Saharan Africa economic growth.
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I. Introduction
Founded at the end of the World War II, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
has played a key role in shaping the global economy. Standing at the center of the world
economic development, the IMF has seen much criticism towards its structure and
lending practices over the past 70 years. In 1986, accompanying the crisis in the third
world countries and the emerging structural problems from the countries in transition, the
IMF started its first formal longer term structural adjustment assistance program to low
income countries, the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF). From 1986 to present, the
IMF’s longer term structural adjustment programs have been evolving and expanding,
and its effectiveness has been the focus of criticism. Although under pressure from
numerous independent studies urging it to abandon its role in development, the IMF has
regarded growth and development the ultimate goal of all its modern programs.
Since its liberation, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the longest period of
economic growth only recently. In spite of this, Mbadlanyana, Sibalukhulu and Cilliers
(2011) predict that most issues relating to severe global poverty will be located in this
region in the next few decades. The issues of African development are long-term.
Starting with the region’s independence, its development has accumulated attention from
most bilateral and multilateral aid agencies; however, a series of traps has prevented the
growth and aid effectiveness in this region. Most of the Sub-Saharan African countries
have joined the IMF membership since the early 1970s, and one of the first groups of
countries borrowing from the structural adjustment programs is from the Sub-Saharan
region. Since 1986, it has been the center location of structural adjustment aid from the
IMF. By 1999, as Hutchison and Noy (2003) calculated, Africa had accumulated 72% of
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all the long-term programs from the IMF since 1952. Notwithstanding, little systematic
attention has been paid to assessing the impact of aid on government actions and the
results in this region (Mbadlanyana, Sibalukhulu, and Cilliers, 2011).
There are a tremendous number of studies evaluating the IMF’s program and
policy effectiveness. Nevertheless, most of these studies have either been focusing on the
short-term balance-of-payment-centered facilities, or have not been specifying any types
of programs at all. Given the different nature of the longer term structural adjustment
programs, therefore, a systematic study is in need. Even in the limited literature on IMF
structural adjustment programs, the latest I have encountered was a review study
published in 2006. Since then, there has been another cycle of changes in IMF’s
structural adjustment programs, which the PRGF had been implemented for ten years and
was succeeded by a new program ECF in 2009. In order to capture the evolution of the
structural adjustment programs in the 2000s, in this paper, I included a time span from
1986 to 2011, the full history of the structural adjustment programs. I selected the SubSaharan African countries as the development context in evaluating the effectiveness of
the IMF’s longer-term structural adjustment programs, including the Structural
Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Extended Credit Facility (ECF).
With a full life-span of ten years of data on the PRGF implementation as well as the new
start of ECF, this paper will provide a more comprehensive scope. While focusing on one
specific region, the region with the most usage of structural programs, I effectively
eliminate the geopolitical heterogeneity that might potentially bias the result.
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In this research, I referred to the political economics model from Ivanova et
al.(2001) to construct a theoretical hypothesis of the relationship between the IMF and
the incumbent government. In the model, the aid and conditionality effectiveness to the
country’s welfare depends on government’s level of concern to the general public and the
bargaining process between the IMF and the government. The higher the IMF’s plan
weights in the bargaining, the more the government is concerned about its people, and
hence, the higher welfare a program brings to.
Based on this model, I ran a series of probit regressions to evaluate the
determinants of participating in an IMF structural adjustment program and tobit
regressions to evaluate the determinants of loan disbursement from each individual
structural adjustment program. At last, a set of fixed effect regressions with robust
country group clustered error adjustment were employed to assess the effect of
participation and loan disbursement of the structural adjustment program on growth rate
in Sub-Saharan countries. I not only looked at the immediate effect from the aid
disbursement, but also the effect afterwards until three years later. According to the
result, the level of loan disbursement from SAF had a negative effect on growth across
years. As the evolution of the IMF’s longer term structural adjustment program, the more
and more positive results are seen in its effect on growth. The ECF, the most recently
modified and adopted program has demonstrated a large and strong statistically
significant positive effect on growth; however, due to data availability, the robustness is
still in need of verification.
Due to data availability, some more extensive econometric skills are not able to
fully account for certain issues. Fixed effect method can only account for the unobserved
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factors that maybe correlated to growth and program participation, and only under the
situation of unobserved factors being stable over the years. Instrumental variable is still
needed to account for the direct relationship between growth and program participation.
The effect of the World Bank is deemed to be significant in the Sub-Saharan region,
especially towards growth and poverty reduction. However, this paper could not find
enough supporting data to control the effect of the World Bank on this region’s growth.
The measurement of the loan disbursement may also bias the effect in the short run.
The rest of this paper continues as follows: Section II provides history and theory
backgrounds for the IMF and its programs, the history of IMF structural adjustment
programs, and the Sub-Saharan development. Section III presents a literature review on
key findings and arguments in previous studies on the effectiveness of IMF programs and
on growth and poverty reduction theories. Section IV provides theoretical framework and
hypotheses for this paper, and introduces variables for the analysis. Section V explains
research methodology. Section VI gives data and descriptive analysis. Section VII
presents regression analysis. Section VIII discusses the key results from the regression;
and lastly, Section VIIII concludes the study by summarizing its findings and
contributions and its policy implementation.

II. Background
A. Brief History of IMF
Founded in December, 1945, with its membership growing from 29 states to 188
at present, the IMF has gone through multiple stages of changes. As an almost universal
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financial institution (Barro and Lee, 2005), its history has been shaped by and is shaping
the world’s historical events, as well as the evolution of economic ideas (Bird, 2007). In
its role in providing regular consultation to all member countries, collecting data and
overseeing the world economy, lending resources and advising on policies to bring about
economic adjustment, the IMF has been on the focus of close attention and critical
examination (Bird, 2007).
When the IMF was officially initiated, its purpose was to oversee the operation of
the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. Besides this main purpose, the IMF
was also an adjustment agency providing advice on balance of payment policy, and a
financing agency providing short-term liquidity to countries encountering balance of
payment problems (Bird and Mosely, 2003). However, since the early 1970s, as the
flexible exchange rate regime replaced the fixed ones, the Bretton Woods system
collapsed; private capital market providing balance of payment financing shifted the
responsibility of the IMF away (Bird and Mosely, 2003). Accordingly, much of the
IMF’s systemic role disappeared.
In 1980s, the Third World debt crisis induced the IMF’s involvement in smaller
and poorer countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Followed by the fall of
communism in the 1990s, it created a number of new borrowing countries, so-called
countries in transition. And indeed, the IMF ceased lending to industrial countries
altogether (Bird and Mosely, 2003). With its increasing involvement in countries and
issues that it was not originally designed to handle, the IMF has been exposed to a
broader range of criticism. The Meltzer Commission, a leading critic, argues that the IMF
was ineffective and inefficient, and was in need of a reform (Bird, 2007). Conditionality
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was also perceived as excessive (Bird, 2004). Facing these criticisms, the IMF started a
reassessment of its programs and is trying to establish a medium-term strategy (IMF,
2005).
B. IMF programs and conditionality
Upon joining the IMF, each member country is required to contribute to 25% of
the quota in the form of international currency or SDR. The size of the quota depends on
the size of the member country’s economy. Hence, the 25% of the quota is free for the
country to take out (Barro and Lee, 2005). If a country, however, needs to withdraw more
than 25% of the quota, it needs to comply with IMF’s loan conditions (Przeworski and
Vreeland, 2000).
The IMF Articles of Agreement entails IMF facilities to provide temporary
balance-of-payment support to countries. In order to fulfill the requirement of
“temporary,” the IMF created the policy of conditionality over time to assist participating
countries to exit quickly from its balance of payment problems (Conway, 2007). The
typical conditionality involves “fiscal austerity, tight monetary policy, and currency
devaluation” (Taylor, 1993). The combination of purchase facility and associated
conditions is referred to as an IMF program. As calculated by Bird (2007), at any one
time, the IMF may have as many as about 60 active programs with individual countries.
IMF programs can be categorized into nonconcessional and concessional loans
based on terms of repayment and interest rate. The typical nonconcessional loans include:
the Stand-By Agreement (SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and
Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The concessional loans
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historically include: Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF), Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), and
currently, the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Standby Credit Facility (SCF), and Rapid
Credit Facility (RCF). Polak (1991) states that the fundamental objectives of programs
are similar, and differences only exist in conditions, timing, and size of the loan
disbursement. In this research, I specifically focus on the longer term structural
adjustment concessional loans through history, which are SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and
currently, ECF.
C. Programs Targeting Growth and Poverty Reduction - History and Importance
Traditionally, the IMF responds to the balance of payment problems through a
system of short-term facilities mainly involving SBA and EFF, covering a period of 1-2
years with repayment between 3 ¼ and 5 years (Barro and Lee, 2005). The notion of
structural adjustment wasn’t born until after the oil crisis in the late 1970s. Structural
adjustment entails a combination of macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic
efficiency and openness (Bird, 2004). Subsequently, in 1986, the IMF established the
SAF as its first longer term structural adjustment program, to its low income members,
and the ESAF in 1987, which had a repayment schedule of over 5-10 years after a 5-year
grace period. In 1999, the ESAF was modified and renamed the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF), which puts economic growth and poverty reduction at the
center (Barro and Lee, 2005). Later in 2009, IMF approved its modification of PRGF into
the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), operated under the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Trust (PRGT), which further streamlined its conditionality. As Bird and Mosely (2003)
explain, these programs impact growth through three channels. The first channel manages
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the aggregate demand. The second raises aggregate supply through structural adjustment.
The third relates to catalytic effect that attracts additional private investment and capital
inflows to the program country.
D. Sub-Saharan Development
After a short prosperous boom following its independence in early 1960s, over the
past 40 years, Africa has stagnated while other developing countries have vastly grown.
Since 1960, Africa’s share in world trade declined, and per capita GDP in Africa was
sluggish. This divergence turned Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan area into the world’s
poorest region. Collier (2006) identifies four development traps for the Sub-Saharan
region: the conflict trap, the corruption trap, the primary commodity trap and the
fractionalized society trap. These traps are shown as wide spread coups, civil strife,
ethnic violence, inefficient use of resource and public administration, decaying
institutional capacity, deteriorating social conditions, increasing environmental
degradation and so on (Heidhues, 2009). They prevented Africa’s development and
weakened the effectiveness of aid. Under these traps, low economic growth ties with low
investment and saving rates, skyrocketed foreign debt, declining output of industry and
manufacturing, and adverse terms of trade (Heidhues, 2009). By 1980s, Africa’s crisis
was deepening. The World Bank and the IMF proposed the structural adjustment
approach for a fundamental shift to stabilize African economy. Heidhues (2009)
summarizes that these programs called for reducing the role of state administration in
macroeconomic policies, containing government spending, privatizing public sectors, and
most importantly, calling for devaluation and trade liberalization in order to improve
balance of payment and control for foreign debt. Subsequently, the introduction of the
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poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) focused more on integrating culture, social,
environmental and political factors in development strategies, and created a framework
for pro-poor growth (Heidhues, 2009; Kibuka, 2007).
While in contrast to the structural programs which were frequently criticized of
having negative impact on the poor, Bird (2004) concludes that PRGF as a leading PRSP
from the IMF, has been shown successful effects on reformations in Sub-Saharan region.
However, PRGF has also been conceived as at cost of increasing unemployment and a
decline in public services, even in health, education, and research. After a decade of
endeavor, it is a crucial time to take advantage of the accumulation of data and reevaluate
the effectiveness of structural adjustment programs on their pro-poor growth target.

III. Literature Review
A. Arguments on Development Centered Programs
The shift of focus from stabilization to economic growth and poverty reduction
has brought up much of the recent argument questioning the role of the IMF. The Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force argues that “IMF should focus on monetary,
fiscal and exchange rate policies plus financial-sector surveillance and reform and stay
out of longer-term structural adjustment.”
The Overseas Development Council (ODC) Task Force also argues that IMF’s
long-term structural lending has not been effective. The ineffectiveness stems from the
lending associated moral hazard issues, the overlapping role of IMF’s structural
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adjustment programs and the World Bank, and the emphasis on mandates and
conditionality. The Meltzer Report claims that IMF long-term adjustment lending yields
moral hazard problems through providing an implicit insurance to private creditors,
which encourages over-lending behavior (Bird and Mosely, 2003). However, Willett
(1999) and Land and Philips (2000) find no significant evidence on this claim. Instead,
empirical evidence shows that ESAF with its tight conditionality had a discouraging
effect on borrowers (Bird, 1995). As to the effectiveness argument, Bird (2004) stated
that there is hardly a scientific consensus. The most commonly accepted statement
suggests that IMF programs have at least a short-run negative effect on economic growth
and possibly enduring adverse effect on growth (Conway, 1994; Killick, 1995;
Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Hutchison, 2001; Barro and Lee, 2001).
Despite the numerous arguments advocating a narrow role for the IMF, that the
IMF should only play as “the lender of the last resort”, Michel Camdessus (1990), the
previous Managing Director of the IMF stated, “Our primary objective is growth… it is
with a view toward growth that we carry out our special responsibility of helping to
correct balance of payments disequilibria and, more generally, to eliminate obstructive
macroeconomic imbalances.” Stanley Fischer, the previous deputy managing director of
the IMF regards that macroeconomic stabilization is only a first step to poverty reduction,
but is not sufficient (in Conway, 2006).
As previously stated, whether IMF indeed influences economic growth has been
subject to a huge number of studies; seldom has any strict consensus emerged as whether
IMF programs positively influenced growth and alleviated poverty. Reasons for this lack
of agreement on the effectiveness of IMF’s structural adjustment program are
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multifarious. The first relates to the individual researcher. Different researchers may have
considered different time periods, or investigated different types of IMF programs
(Atoyan and Conway, 2005). Evaluation of IMF programs also involves different
econometric techniques, especially towards the selection issues and endogeneity issues.
The most common approaches to address the endogeneity problem include before and
after analysis, control group methodology, fixed effects, and instrumental variables
(Easterly, 2005). The second reason is the domestic statistical capacity. Most data
available for research is evidence-based monitoring in program participating countries.
Constructing statistical monitoring requires financial and human capital support, which is
the shortcoming in LICs, hence providing constraints on data availability to researchers
(Kibuka, 2007). Thirdly, the effectiveness of program conditionality also depends on the
degree of implementation (Arpac, Bird and Mandilaras, 2008).
B. Growth and Poverty Reduction Theories
The nature of growth theory is ambiguous. The basic principle of growth relies
upon factor accumulation and factor productivity. Bird (2004) claims that beyond this
point, however, theories of growth become complicated. Empirically, Barro (1991) finds
that growth is positively related to initial human capital and negatively related to the
initial real per capita GDP. Growth is negatively related to the share of government
spending in GDP and positively related to political stability and market health. The neoclassical model states that poor countries are also assumed to growth faster than the rich
ones, with faster factor accumulations. On the other hand, poor countries can also be at a
disadvantage due to low life expectancy, which retards incentive to invest in human
capital (Cohen and Soto, 2002). Other studies, as documented by Collier (2008), show
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that openness and economic liberalization, health and geography make a significant
difference to growth. Economic liberalization along with significant institution reform is
found positively influencing growth. Openness to trade also has a strong positive effect
on growth. Berg and Krueger (2002) argue that trade and openness contribute to growth
and thereby alleviate poverty, however Demery (2000) and Rajan and Bird (2002)
provide evidence that not all groups among the poor benefit from growth in terms of
openness and trade liberalization. Land-locked countries and those in the tropical zones
tend to growth slower (Collier, 2008).

IV. Theoretical Framework and Variable Introduction
A. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses:
This research selects all longer-term structural adjustment programs from the IMF
that existed throughout history, evaluating factors leading to the program participation,
and measures the growth outcome from program participation. Considering each
programs individually, we can receive conclusion of the program’s effect across years.
Comparing the growth effect across programs, we can also reach the conclusion of
whether the evolution of structural adjustment programs in the IMF has been effective.
Program participation is further measured by whether a country actually participates in a
program and by the amount of loans disbursed from the program as a proxy to the
extensiveness of participation.
In a typical political economy model, we regard the IMF as an international
financial institution providing support and policy conditionality in affecting the
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incumbent government’s economic policy choices. The incumbent government decides
whether to join a program or not. Therefore, it plots a bigger picture once we figure out
what factors contribute to government’s participation decision.
Ivanova et al.’s (2001) constructed the model describing the welfare gain for a
country from an international financial institution loan based on the interactions between
the amount of the loan and the policy distortion. Upon signing into a program, the
incumbent government, then, provides the actual policy changes incorporating the IMF’s
conditionality as well as loans to affect the utility level of participation in a program.
However, the optimal country welfare is not always the sole goal of the incumbent
government. They often subject to corruption and special interest group distortion. In this
paper, due to limited time and data availability, country fixed effect is introduced to
account for the unobserved variables that include these policy distortion factors.
According to Ivanova et al. (2001), international assistance has a diminishing
marginal return on country’s welfare. The level of appropriate conditionality, in return,
accelerates the effect from loan. But, in corresponding to the moral hazard hypothesis,
IMF loans induce bad economic policy with a higher level of policy distortion;
Boockmann and Dreher (2003) suggest that the money disbursed increases borrowing
government’s leeway, thus reducing incentives to reform. Dreher and Vaubel (2004) also
find evidence that more expansive economic policies are found in countries with higher
IMF loan disbursement. Therefore, we don’t have a clear hypothetical direction of loan
effect on growth. As introduced in previous sections, one of the main channels of the
IMF influencing growth is the catalytic effect of bringing private investment and capital
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inflow (Bird and Mosley, 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that participation effect on
growth is larger than the disbursement amount effect on growth.
Other things also affect the objective function of the IMF and the objective
function of the incumbent government. Due to the concessional condition of the
structural adjustment programs, the interest rate set by the IMF is minimal; hence, the
difference between the market rate and the interest rate is considered a cost to the IMF.
Therefore, we would expect the higher market rate, the less likely the IMF disburses a
loan. As presented earlier in the Literature Review section, one channel for the IMF to
influence the welfare of a country also relies on the catalytic effect. The higher the loan
disbursed often sends a signal of higher trust to the private creditors; hence we would see
a higher investment to contribute to growth along with the loan program. If a country is
participating in another IMF short-term program, I would see an accelerating effect of
loan on growth, since the country is targeting both short-term and longer term
adjustment, and the government should have low policy distortion to accept
conditionality from both programs.
According to previous literature, human capital is hypothesized to be positively
correlated to growth. As to the initial conditions of an economy, the neo-classical theory
predicts that poorer countries grow faster to catch up; however, it may also represents a
worse situation for the program to take effect; therefore, its direction of impact is hard to
suspect.
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B. Variable Introduction:
Most existing literature studying the growth effect of IMF programs has either
chosen the measurement of result at the program year, immediately after the program
year, or using the average growth rate of periods. In evaluating the growth effect of the
longer-term programs, however, it is ideal to put a longer time span (of at least 10 years)
to see the lagged effect on growth. Nevertheless, due to data availability, I would have to
sacrifice the evaluation of part or all of PRGFs and all of ECFs to sustain the 10 year time
span. Therefore, in this research, I focuse on dependent variables of growth rate in the
program year, growth rate one year after the loan disbursement, growth rate two years
after the loan disbursement, and growth rate three years after the loan disbursement. In
this way, I extended the observation to a slightly longer period than what mostly
literature have done, although still in the rein of “short-run”. Bird and Mosely (2003)
describe that short-run effect is crucial for the successful completion of a program. If a
structural adjustment program only focuses on its long-run effect and ignores its shortterm effect, e.g. ignoring short-term growth, it will likely encounter strong social and
political opposition and eventually fail. Notwithstanding, I will still provide growth effect
in eight, nine, ten years in the appendix to supplement the result.
According to the theoretical framework and following Dreher (2006), this paper
employs independent variables in evaluating the growth effect from six different groups:
structural adjustment variables, involvement in the IMF, human capital indicators, world
financial market indicator, initial economic indicator, and previous government policy.
The structural adjustment variables are divided into two sets: one set considers simply the
participation in each structural adjustment programs (SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and ECF),
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while the other considers the level of loan disbursement from each program (SAFamount,
ESAFamount, PRGFamount and ECFamount). Involvement in the IMF includes
inotherporgram. If a country is in another program (which includes short term traditional
lending programs like Standbys and EFFs) targeting short-term balance of payment
adjustment, it usually have to sacrifice its longer term goal, such as growth. Human
capital indicators include populationgrowth and fertilityrate. Population growth and
fertility rate provides potential for labor and human capital accumulation towards growth,
hence are perceived to be positive. Initial economic indicators in the regression include
Ln_lag_gdppercapta1 and lag_investment1. Initial GDP per capital is hypothesized to
have a negative relationship with growth; in other words, growth rises with worse initial
situation. Initial investment is hypothesized to be positively related to growth. Previous
policy group includes inflation and lag_governmentconsumption1. These two variables
represent the level of policy distortion prior to the loan disbursement. We would see the
negative relationship between policy distortion and growth rate. And lastly, libor
represents the world market.
Apart from examining the growth effect, this paper also seeks for factors affecting
program participation and loan disbursement for different programs. According to
previous literature studying the determinant of program participation, I also include six
groups of variables: involvement in the IMF, debt and national account, political
environment and ideology, world financial market indicator, initial economic conditions,
previous debt and national account. In this setting, the involvement in the IMF includes:
inotherprogram, Ln_quotasize, and yearsmember. Debt and national account includes
totaldebtservice, shorttermdebt, and currentaccount (hence the previous situation
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includes lagged one year term for each one of the three). Political ideology related
variables include: democracy and civilliberty. World financial market is indicated by
libor, again. Initial economic conditions inlucde Ln_lag_gdppercapita, and
lag_investment.

V. Econometrics Methodology
As previously touched on, there are a variety of methods commonly used to
evaluate the impact of IMF programs. First, before-after analysis identifies the economic
growth difference before the program approval and after the program completion. Any
measurable growth is then attributed to the effect of the program. However, critics argue
that this would understate the program’s effect since participating in a program often
happens in the time of crisis. The second approach is often referred to as “with-without”
approach, which is commonly used to compare the growth rate in program countries with
that in a control group. However, disadvantage exists in the identification of control
group. Programs are chosen in countries with specific characters, which may be the
crucial differences from those non-program countries. The third is regression analysis.
The regression analysis is considered the most promising approach, but only if the
endogeneity problem is carefully accounted (Dreher, 2006; Evrensel, 2007). Evrensel
(2002) concludes that all approaches are problematic, and a perfect solution to problems
in the program evaluation does not exist. In this paper, I choose to use a regression
analysis to measure the growth effect of IMF programs in Sub-Saharan region.
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As previously indicated, the IMF programs are often chosen in times of economic
crisis. We usually see a country signing into an IMF contract only under severe economic
issues. Therefore, the participation in the IMF program is not independent from growth
rate. The endogeneity problem associated with IMF variables needs to be accounted
carefully. Previous research has frequently applied the instrumental variable method and
the fixed effect method (Dreher, 2006). As with the measurement of the success of IMF
programs, no approach to account for the endogeneity is perfect. The difficulty of
implementing the instrumental approach lies in the finding of variables that only affect
the probability of programs participation and loan distribution, without affecting growth.
The deficiency of fixed effect approach can only account for certain types of endogeneity
issues. Due to data availability and limited time span of research, I could not identify
enough IV’s to effectively account for endogeneity in the regression. Hence, I use the
fixed effect method with standard error adjusted for robust clustering by country to
compensate the lack of instrument. The fixed effect effectively accounts for the
unobserved factors that relate to growth and program participation (and loan
disbursement), only if unobserved factors do not vary from year to year. For example,
besides the IMF, the World Bank has been heavily involved in the long term
development programs in Sub-Saharan countries. The impact from the World Bank can
be reflected in the growth rate in a country. It may also relate to the IMF’s evaluation of
the country’s situation in accepting the program request and the loan disbursement. I plot
year against all independent variables from growth regressions for each country to
examine possible variations across time. The result reveals a relative stable trend of the
observed factors; hence, we infer that the unobserved factors stable over time, and that
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the fixed effect model is effective. Although effective, the direct causal relationship
between program participation variables and growth can still not be accounted. A
systematic set of instruments are still needed for the future research.
Hence, the econometric model specifies as:
growth = f(structural adjustment program participation/disbursement,
involvement in the IMF, human capital, world financial market indicator, initial
economic conditions, previous policy distortion, country dummies)

(1)

Besides the growth regressions, for the regressions considering program
participation determinants, I use probit regression; and for determinants on loan
disbursement amount, I choose tobit regression.
Therefore, we have:
Program participation/loan disbursement = f(inotherprogram, Ln_quotasize,
yearsmember. totaldebtservice, shorttermdebt, currentaccount, lag_totaldebtservice1,
lag_shorttermdebt1, lag_currentaccount1, democracy, civilliberty, libor,
Ln_lag_gdppercapita1, lag_investment1)

(2)

VI. Data and Descriptive Analysis
This research targets the impact of IMF mid-term to long-term structural
adjustment lending programs on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan regions. In this
paper, mid-term to long-term structural programs from the IMF include SAF, ESAF,
PRGF, and ECF. Officially, 45 member countries are included in the IMF’s Sub-Saharan

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2013

19

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 10 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 2

regional groups. Due to lack of sufficient data, South Sudan is not included in the
analysis. Since the first official structural adjustment program, SAF, was formally
adopted in 1986, I included a time span from 1986 to 2011. In the sample, Senegal
received the first SAF loan in 1986 for the amount of SDR 0.8 million. There are a total
of 1127 observations. Each observation represents country i in year t. From now on, we
refer to each observation as a country year. We refer to country years in a longer term
structural adjustment program as program country year; otherwise, we refer it to nonprogram country year. Among all country years, there are 518 program country years,
and 171 country years in other IMF lending programs, which include mostly SBA, EFF,
and a few other temporary lending programs, and the rest are not in any typical IMF
programs.
The table below (Table 1) presents descriptive statistics of all variables in the
research (excluding the lag term variables). From Table 1, we can see that 19% of the
country years have been under SAF programs, 17% in ESAF, 19% in PRGF, and 3.2% in
ECF. The average growth rate is about 3.88% for all country years. Once we break down
the full sample, the average growth rate for a program country year is 4.18% and 3.62%
for a non-program country year (refer to Table 2, below).
Table 2 presents two sample t-tests results comparing differences in mean growth
rates between non-program country years and program country years. We split the
sample into participating in SAF, ESAF, PRGF, ECF, and non-program country years.
Comparing the mean growth differences for SAF participation years, none of the groups
provides support for a statistically significant mean value from non-program country
years. Same situation lies for the comparison between ESAF participation and non-
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program participation. However, strong and statistically significant different mean
growth rates are shown between PRGF participation and non-program country years
across evaluation years. Although the sample size is small for ECF participation (only 36
observations), country years participating in ECF have a significantly different mean
growth rate from non-participating country years across measured years except for one
year after loan disbursement.
Graph 1 (below) plots the difference of average growth rate between each
program groups and non-program country years starting from the year t when the loan is
disbursed to year t+3, three years after the loan disbursement. Overall, the result from
two sample t-tests is optimistic. However, simply comparing the mean growth rate may
be misleading, since various other factors may affect the growth rate outside of IMF
programs. Therefore, we proceed to regression analysis.
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Graph 1 – Average Growth Rate Difference Compared to NonNonProgram Country Years Across Years
SAF

ESAF

PRGF

ECF

2.464***
2.060***
1.779***

1.802***
1.413***

1.447**

0.250

1.330***

0.374
0.574

0.270
t+1 -0.113

t
-0.893*

-1.060*
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics
Variable
SAF
SAFAmount
ESAF
ESAFamount
PRGF
PRGFamount
ECF
ECFamount
growth
civilliberty
currentaccountpergdp
democracy
fertilityrate
inflation
inotherprogram
governmentconsumptionpergdp
investment
libor
ln_lag_gdppercapita1
ln_quotasize
populationgrowth
shorttermdebtpertotaldebt
totaldebtservicepergdp
yearsmember
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Obs
1127
1127
1127
1127
1127
1127
1127
1127
1127
1127
1099
1036
1114
1084
1127
1012
1060
1127
1111
1127
1127
1072
901
1127

Mean
0.189885
5.268438
0.165927
13.18483
0.168589
3.304348
0.031943
0.837622
3.878707
4.397516
-6.22196
2.971042
5.396209
2.77E+09
0.15173
15.7328
21.40917
4.643067
104.051
1912618
2.444457
9.436212
15.61074
24.69299

Std. Dev.
0.392384
17.49463
0.372181
53.25905
0.374555
18.39493
0.175927
7.411364
7.698245
1.43847
10.5327
3.341603
1.256535
3.10E+10
0.358919
7.892165
12.12593
2.411443
693.7273
1.28E+07
1.182456
10.25732
15.4839
9.11588

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-51.0309
1
-124.557
0
1.47
0.021
0
2.047121
1.372
0.507
4.164434
14.91412
-7.53325
0
0.411216
0

Max
1
182
1
662
1
447
1
158
106.2798
7
25.627
10
8.007
5.16E+11
1
69.54283
125.168
9.272
8755.373
1.02E+08
9.770495
71.4592
134.788
40
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Table 2 Two-sample t test with unequal variances testing mean growth
not in structural
adjustment program in SAF
in ESAF
mean
3.623
2.73
3.892
growth in the std.
8.546
6.87
7.354
current year
mean difference
0.893
-0.27
t-stats
1.53
-0.426
mean
3.921
2.861
3.808
growth one
std.
8.499
8.394
7.589
year after
mean difference
1.06
0.113
t-stats
1.583
0.172
mean
3.947
2.913
4.321
growth two
std.
8.239
8.764
7.982
years after
mean difference
1.034
-0.374
t-stats
1.508
-0.556
mean
3.799
3.33
4.373
growth three std.
8.199
9.136
8.051
years after
mean difference
0.469
-0.574
t-stats
0.663
-0.849
n
609
214
187

in PRGF
5.402
4.457
-1.779***
-3.7556
5.334
4.351
-1.413***
-3.025
5.277
4.187
-1.33***
-2.946
5.601
4.04
-1.902***
-4.067
190

in ECF
5.07
3.57
-1.447**
-2.102
4.171
4.032
-0.250
-0.331
6.007
4.139
-2.06***
-2.689
6.264
1.863
-2.464***
-5.42
36

VII. Main Regression Results
To further examine the theories and arguments as developed in previous sections,
and to examine the hypothesis of growth impact from participating in a longer-term
structural adjustment program, this section provides regression analysis to assist
explanation.
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A. Determinants of Program Participation and Loan Disbursement
Before examining the growth effect of each program, I start with regressions
looking for what determines a country’s program participation and what determines the
level of loan disbursement. As presented in the theoretical framework and hypothesis
section, the effect of IMF loan programs on country’s welfare depends on the incumbent
government’s decision, which further results from the bargaining process between the
IMF and the incumbent government. The bargaining process determines whether the
government accepts conditions imposed by the IMF along with the loan. Therefore, apart
from its direct result, the factors determining program participation also serves an
important role in screening for selection variables. After the loan approval, the level of
loan distribution also relies upon multifarious factors, ranging from the global market,
compliance with the conditionality of the borrowing country, and the bargaining power
between the IMF and the incumbent government.
Table 3 (below) presents regression results for determinants of IMF longer-term
structural adjustment program participation and level of loan disbursement. For each
program, I used the tobit regression with error term clustered by country and robust
adjusted to examine determinants for loan disbursement amount, and the probit
regression to examine the program participation.
The negative coefficient for inotherprogram for ESAF and PRGF participations
and loan disbursements are statistically significant. It suggests that if a country is in other
IMF programs during the year, it is likely that it is not going to participate in the longerterm structural adjustment program. The variable inotherprograms includes short-term
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facilities, primarily SBAs and EFFs, dealing with short term balance of payment crisis.
When countries running into short-term balance of payment problems, they are likely to
adjust immediate severe short-term problems first before adjusting longer term structural
problems, therefore, they are not likely to enter a structural adjustment program. Having
already been in a short-term program, the country has subjected to much conditionality. It
is less likely for a country to accept more conditionality and lose its authority and policy
freedom. Years of membership has a positive relationship on PRGF and ECF
participation, but a negative relationship on SAF and ESAF participation. We would
expect that the longer a country is in the IMF, the more likely it is to accept help from the
IMF, and the more evidence the IMF has to justify the loan disbursement. However, it
may also be true that the longer a country is in the IMF membership, the more requests it
is likely to bring up, hence it is less likely for it to receive the approval. The quota remain
might also be limited due to overdraft. Democracy and civil liberty index are found
statistically significant across regressions. Previous literature provides evidence that a
more liberal and democratic country tends to resemble the IMF’s dominant political
ideology, hence is more prone to the IMF programs, and hence the IMF programs are
more keen to offer help. However, the more democratic government may be less prone to
ask the IMF for help. LIBOR rate is an index for global financial market. The higher it
reaches, the more expensive it is for the IMF to disburse its loans. Interestingly, it is only
found positively correlated to SAF and ESAF program participation. The negative
coefficients of the lagged one year GDP per capita on the all program participation probit
and loan disbursement tobit regressions show that countries with worse initial economic
situation tend to participate in a program. And the worse the initial situation, the more
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money the IMF is likely to disburse through the loan. All else being equal, a more
developed economy has more domestic resources; hence it is less likely for them to
borrow from the IMF. This shows, again, the endogeneity issue between program
participation and economic condition. The current year account balance situations tend to
have a negative relationship to SAF program participation and positive relationship to
ECF disbursement. We may expect that the higher debt service, the more likely a country
is running into balance of payment and associated issues; and is therefore in need of
structural adjustment assistance from the IMF. However, countries tend to regard the IMF
as the last lending resort. The increase of current year debt may imply a country’s ability
to garner resource from other parties. It is possible that countries having other borrowing
channels would be less likely to participate in the IMF program.
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Table 3 –Determinants of IMF longer term structural adjustment programs and loans
SAF
Inotherprogram
ln_quotasize
Yearsmember
totaldebtservice
pergdp
shorttermdebtp
ertotaldebt
currentaccountp
ergdp
democracy
civilliberty
libor
ln_lag_gdpperca
pita1
lag_investment1
lag_totaldebtser
vicepergdp1
lag_shorttermde
btpertotaldebt1
lag_currentacco
untpergdp1
_cons

ESAF

PRGF

ECF

Tobit

Probit

Tobit

Probit

Tobit

Probit

Tobit

Probit

-3.065

0.039

-67.989

-0.541

-34.316

-1.267

(5.760)

(0.159)

(31.676)**

(0.177)***

(15.047)**

(0.345)***

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.00)***

(0.00)

(0.00)***

(0.00)

(0.00)***

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-1.688

-0.056

-1.613

-0.015

2.020

0.077

3.089

0.134

(0.415)***

(0.009)***

-0.580

0.002

(1.322)

(0.009)*

(0.635)***

(0.011)***

(2.072)

(0.076)*

-0.816

0.005

-0.286

-0.016

1.911

-0.029

(0.657)

(0.006)

(1.693)

(0.005)

(0.268)

(0.008)**

(1.141)*

(0.141)

0.150

-0.035

0.632

-0.018

-0.255

-0.017

2.390

-0.062

(0.096)

(0.022)*

(0.552)

(0.019)

(0.256)

(0.014)

(5.802)

(0.052)

-0.366

-0.020

-1.800

-0.015

0.471

0.020

3.391

0.095

(0.282)

(0.012)*

(1.215)

(0.012)

(0.315)

(0.013)

(2.075)*

(0.070)

-2.795

-0.069

-5.660

-0.013

1.458

0.045

9.344

0.067

(0.152)*

(0.027)***

(6.383)

(0.026)

(0.949)

(0.027)*

(6.077)

(0.12)

-5.593

-0.172

-27.602

-0.197

-3.722

-0.182

-7.263

-0.711

(2.734)**

(0.066)***

(15.995)*

(0.065)***

(3.785)

(0.074)**

(16.697)

(0.451)

1.044

0.072

10.279

0.101

-1.158

-0.027

-553.740

-9.979

(1.056)

(0.035)**

(2.841)***

(0.035)***

(0.878)

(0.035)

(1060.23)

(9.054)

-15.447

-0.423

-41.127

-0.341

-11.683

-0.506

-33.473

-1.037

(6.860)**

(0.113)***

(23.614)*

(0.112)***

(4.642)**

(0.103)***

(11.436)***

(0.546)**

-0.252

-0.014

-2.123

-0.017

-0.128

-0.004

-2.302

-0.097

(0.368)

(0.006)**

(1.563)

(0.006)***

(0.272)

(0.008)

(1.560)

(0.056)*

-0.098

0.007

-0.622

0.011

-0.282

0.003

-0.839

0.079

(0.546)

(0.006)

(1.562)

(0.005)**

(0.337)

(0.007)

(1.084)

(0.098)

0.288

-0.001

1.876

-0.008

0.166

-0.013

0.410

0.025

(0.199)

(0.021)

(0.965)**

(0.019)

(0.179)

(0.015)

(2.233)

(0.048)

-0.086

-0.007

-2.006

-0.018

-0.859

-0.026

-0.780

-0.008

(0.374)

(0.012)

(1.504)

(0.013)

(0.462)*

(0.014)*

(1.937)

(0.075)

131.954

3.835

237.685

2.023

12.073

1.332

412.134

12.095

(43.194)***

(0.958)***

(163.723)

(0.915)**

(43.704)

(0.895)

(580.358)

(7.988)

sigma

35.041

142.708

29.132

42.185

Prob > F

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Predictive ability
N

76.34%
786

786
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786

82.95%
786

786

98.85%
786

786
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B. Growth Effect
After examining the IMF longer-term structural adjustment program participation
and loan disbursement, we can proceed to the regression of the effect of these structural
adjustment programs on growth. This paper borrows the growth regression variable
specification from Dreher (2006); however, I not only look at immediate growth effect
from the IMF longer term structural adjustment programs for the year loans are
disbursed, i.e. used, but also the growth effect one year after, two years after, and three
years after. Therefore, I employ four sets of regressions. Each set of regressions include
two specifications. Specification 1 only takes into account whether a country year is in
any of the structural adjustment programs. Specification 2 only looks at the amount of
each structural adjustment programs.
Table 4 (below) presents the fixed effect regression results for the impact of
longer-term structural adjustment program on growth across years. According to results
from Specification 1, for SAF, the first longer-term structural adjustment program, it has
a consistent negative effect on growth starting from its immediate disbursement;
however, the negative effect is only statistically significant at two years after loan
disbursement. Participating in a SAF is expected to decrease growth by 1.381 percentage
points two years after the loan disbursement, holding other things constant. For the
second structural adjustment program, ESAF, unfortunately, it does not present any
statistically significant relationship to growth across years, although the effects are seen
positive. These results correspond to the critics from previous research, such as The
Meltzer Commission on the effectiveness of IMF structural adjustment programs.
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Starting 1999, the IMF initiated a series of program adjustment and began to
“streamline” its conditionality, which then produced the PRGF. Indeed, according to the
regression results, participating in PRGF has shown a steadier and statistically significant
growth effect across years. Involving in a PRGF is expected to improve growth of the
immediate year by 1.835 percentage points, ceteris paribus; is expected to improve
growth the next year by 1.127 percentage points, ceteris paribus; 0.892 percentage points
two years after, ceteris paribus; and 1.312 percentage points on growth three years after,
ceteris paribus. In 2009, the IMF further streamlined its conditionality, aiming at having
the participating country owning structural adjustment. Accordingly, it initiated the ECF
to replace the PRGF. From the regression analysis, ECF, compared to PRGF, has a larger
effect on growth across years; however, the effect on growth second year after does not
shown significant. Participating in ECF is predicted to improve growth by 2.864
percentage points immediately, ceteris paribus; by 2.759 percentage points two years
after the loan disbursement, ceteris paribus; and to improve growth by 2.471 percentage
points three years after initial disbursement, ceteris paribus.
Proceeding to examine the effect of loan disbursement amount on growth, we
look at Specification 2. Similar to results from Specification 1, SAF has shown a
statistically significant negative effect on growth. Holding everything else constant, from
the year the loan is disbursed to two years after disbursement, each one million SDR
disbursement from SAF account to a country is likely to retard growth by -0.03
percentage points, -0.033 percentage points, and -0.045 percentage points (the effect on
the third year after disbursement is not statistically significant, hence not mentioning
here). ESAF, again, does not present significant effect on growth. Although its effect on
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year t0 is statistically significant, each million SDR of disbursement only improves
growth by 0.006 percentage points. PRGF disbursement amount is seen statistically
significantly correlated to growth only for the first two years. Each one million SDR
disbursement from PRGF to a country improves through by 0.02 percentage points for
the current year, and by 0.01 percentage points the next year, ceteris paribus.
Interestingly, ECF has only had an implementation of three years in the data set; its
disbursement has shown strong statistically significant improvement on growth across
years. All else equal, each one million SDR disbursement from ECF account is projected
to improve growth by 0.053 percentage points in the immediate year, 0.038 percentage
points the year after. For the two and three years after initial disbursement, it is expected
to improve growth by 0.038 percentage points and 0.030 percentage points, ceteris
paribus. Comparing the statistically significant coefficients between Specification 1 and
2 for each year for each program, we see that participation dummy variables often have a
dramatically larger coefficient than disbursement amount variables. Reason behind may
lead to the catalytic effect of joining an IMF structural adjustment program. Specification
2, loan disbursement amount for each program only measures the effect from each
million SDR disbursement on growth. However, dummy for participation in Specification
1 generically depicts the total participation effect, which may includes the effect from
structural adjustment besides returns from loans, as well as the indicator effect for other
private capital inflows that are not captured by the disbursement amount.
Bird and Mosley (2003) provides hypothesis that growth effect from compressing
demand might provide J-curve result. In another words, short-term drawback and longer
term growth. In the event that shorter term growth effect from SAF and ESAF don’t show
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optimistic results, hence, I proceed to examine their longer-term growth effect. Applying
the same fixed effect regression model, I use the growth rate eight, nine, ten years from
initial disbursement. The detail table is presented in the Appendix, Table 5. The result
turns out to be not material. None of the program variables (dummy for participation and
disbursement amount) show a statistically significant impact on growth not only for SAF
and ESAF, but also across programs, despite the IMF’s effort of modifying it through
years.
Apart from the impact of structural adjustment programs on growth, some other
variables also provide interesting and important feedbacks on growth from the fixed
effect models. Populationgrowth shows a strong and statistically significant positive
effect on growth across years (except three years afterwards). This variable implies a
direct human capital accumulation, which contributes to growth; however, its effect
losses significance in later years. Reasons associated with this effect are ambiguous.
Seeing the population growth rate is the net of birth rate and death rate. We may see a
longer life expectancy which leads to smaller death rate as the economy improves, which
may also prolong working age, thus contributing to growth in the near years. However,
the associated increase in birth rate associated may divert the labor productivity and
dilute its effect in later years. Fertility rate is seen to have a strong and significant
negative impact on growth in the first two years, but disappears in the later two years. We
may infer that better health conditions, which may relate to higher income and growth,
lead to higher fertility rate. However, newborn babies require care, so more people may
remain at home to care for the children and are not participating in production activities.
The initial GDP per capita is found to be negatively related to growth (only not for the
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year after the current year), and the magnitude of impact increases as well. According
neoclassical economic growth theories, we may suspect a faster growth rate if a country
comes from an inferior situation. And lastly, LIBOR rate has a positive relationship with
growth rate in the current year, and a negative relationship with growth two years later,
and three years later.
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Table 4 –Effect of IMF longer-term structural lending programs on growth in 0, 1, 2, 3 years

SAF
ESAF
PRGF
ECF

growth t

growth t+1

growth t+2

growth t+3

Robust Clustered

Robust Clustered

Robust Clustered

Robust Clustered

1
-0.897

2

1
-0.551

2

1
-1.381

2

1
-0.406

(0.904)

(0.730)

(0.523)**

(0.659)

0.702

0.144

1.016

0.905

(0.728)

(0.732)

(0.814)

(0.734)

1.835

1.127

0.892

1.312

(0.444)***

(0.545)**

(0.473)*

(0.575)**

2.864

1.507

2.759

2.471

(0.932)***
SAFAmount
ESAFamount
PRGFamount
ECFamount

(1.024)

(0.881)***

2

(0.721)***

-0.030

-0.033

-0.045

-0.022

(0.014)**

(0.013)**

(0.011)***

(0.015)

0.006

0.002

0.004

-0.001

(0.003)*

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.018

0.010

0.007

0.007

(0.006)***

(0.004)**

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.053

0.038

0.038

0.030

(0.011)***

(0.010)***

(0.012)***

(0.009)***

0.678

0.280

-0.119

-0.367

0.040

-0.397

-0.160

-0.635

(0.498)

(0.479)

(0.418)

(0.373)

(0.463)

(0.444)

(0.566)

(0.572)

1.236

1.355

1.092

1.162

0.618

0.717

0.353

0.425

(0.262)***

(0.270)***

(0.235)***

(0.250)***

(0.229)***

(0.243)***

(0.252)

(0.274)

-1.212

-1.497

-0.986

-1.093

-0.170

-0.253

0.108

0.024

(0.608)**

(0.567)***

(0.6)*

(0.564)*

(0.520)

(0.491)

(0.468)

(0.462)

-0.943

-0.958

-0.855

-0.887

-1.826

-1.833

-1.909

-1.968

(0.535)*

(0.558)*

(0.953)

(0.978)

(0.931)**

(0.955)*

(1.109)*

(1.167)*

0.173

0.175

0.109

0.109

0.128

0.128

0.035

0.036

(0.111)

(0.113)

(0.050)**

(0.052)**

(0.086)

(0.089)

(0.044)

(0.045)

-0.166

-0.164

-0.066

-0.067

0.019

0.015

0.032

0.033

(0.085)*

(0.090)*

(0.073)

(0.073)

(0.042)

(0.045)

(0.059)

(0..060)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)*

(0.00)*

0.186

0.143

0.006

-0.015

-0.320

-0.361

-0.536

-0.566

(0.102)*

(0.105)

(0.089)

(0.091)

(0.097)***

(0.098)***

(0.122)***

(0.119)***

11.095

12.936

10.583

11.562

13.358

14.183

15.589

16.876

(5.759)*

(5.661)**

(8.343)

(8.356)

(7.500)*

(7.508)*

(8.595)*

(8.939)*

sigma_u

2.353

2.222

1.955

1.934

2.587

2.476

3.198

3.087

sigma_e

5.631

5.642

5.576

5.566

5.621

5.615

5.594

5.601

Rho

0.149

0.134

0.109

0.108

0.175

0.163

0.246

0.233

inotherprogram
populationgrowth
fertilityrate
ln_lag_gdppercapita1
lag_investment1
lag_governmentconsu
mptionpergdp1
inflation
libor
_cons
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VIII. Discussion
The graph below (Graph 2) plots the coefficients of participating in each loan
programs from the fixed effect model across years. It provides a direct illustration of
program effects. In summary, the regression analysis shows that longer term adjustment
programs generally do have a statistically significant impact on growth rate in the SubSaharan region immediately or in the short term, especially for the recent programs after
“streamlining”.
The IMF’s involvement in the structural adjustment often emphasizes on
improving the economic infrastructure, which, therefore, puts aggregate demand
management at the center under the binding constraint of external financing. Facing the
lackluster effect on growth from the programs, Bird and Mosely (2003) comments that
such is the high cost from policy of compressing aggregate demand. They summarize the
various discussions on the IMF policies by saying that to compress aggregate demand,
the demand for demand for imports must be reduced and the current account balance of
payments must be strengthened. Uncomfortable results of these approaches include
oppressing investment in private sectors and government expenditure. The current
account improvement now is often at the cost of its future deterioration. These results all
tend to have adverse effect on growth, and are not favorable to the incumbent
government (Bird and Mosely, 2003). Such is the case in the earlier time structural
adjustment, especially SAF. In the context of LICs, financial markets and tax system are
often incomplete. This leads to bigger obstacles that monetary and fiscal policies and
exchange rate adjustment policies are facing. Therefore, in order to alleviate political
resilience, since PRGF, the IMF has tried to streamline its associated conditionality and
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allow the country to take the ownership of a program. Hence, from the regression result,
we see a significant improvement on growth impact from ESAF to PRGF. In ECF, the
IMF has further strengthened the protection to social safety net, health and education
expenditure, and tax regime reformation into its longer term structural adjustment
package. This further diminishes the adjustment fictions, and supplements other core
adjustment policies to ensure a more successful achievement.

Graph 2 – Effect of LongerLonger-Term Structural Adjustment
Programs on Growth Rate Across Years
SAF

ESAF

PRGF

ECF
2.471***

2.864***
2.759***
1.507

1.312**

1.835***
1.127**

0.892*

0.905

0.702
t
-0.897
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VIIII. Conclusion
Although numerous studies have targeted the IMF’s program effectiveness,
limited research has been done to identify the effectiveness of specific types of program.
Among the studies that categorize the impact from different types, most have been
focused on IMF’s short-term lending programs on balance-of-payment. Although
systematic empirical studies on IMF longer-term structural adjustment programs to low
income countries have been missing, various criticisms have been questioning the
validity of their existence. Therefore, it is time to gather more available data resources to
evaluate the effectiveness of IMF’s longer-term structural adjustment programs and to
provide evidence on whether the amendment of these programs has been positive.
Previously, because of the limit of data, for the limited study on structural
adjustment programs, most researchers only evaluate whether a country was in a
program. This study look the full time span of 25 years from 1986 to 2011 and selected
44 countries in the Sub-Saharan region to evaluate not only the participation effect, but
also the level of loan disbursement of SAF, ESAF, PRGF, and ECF on growth. Due to
data availability, I only measure the growth rate immediately after disbursement, one year
after the disbursement, two years afterwards, and three years afterwards. Although not a
perfect measurement, often times, the success of longer-term structural adjustment
depends on short-term effect. Positive short-term effect provides leeway for further
adjustment.
Prior to evaluating the growth effect, this paper also seeks to find variables
determining the loan program participation and the loan amount disbursement. A set of
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tobit regressions provide evidence on program loan disbursement and a set of probit
regressions provide insight on program participation.
Two sample t-tests comparing the mean value of growth rate between program
country years and non program country years corresponds to the regression analysis in
terms of the general trend of the program impact on growth from the current year to three
years later. However, the level of significance varies from methods to methods. Lastly,
fixed effect models account for endogeneity issues providing a more convincing result on
the impact of program participation and loan disbursement on growth.
In summary, through the history of the evolution of structural adjustment
programs, the first longer term program, namely SAF created in 1986, had a negative
growth impact on participating countries. Luckily, it was abandoned in the early 1990s.
Instead, ESAF, the second longer term structural adjustment concessional financing
program, which was enlarged in 1996, showed statistically insignificant positive effect on
growth. In 1999, ESAF was “streamlined” and reformed to PRGF. Aiming at being more
efficient and effective, after trimming much of attached conditionality, PRGF does have
evidence of creating stronger growth effect than its predecessor, ESAF. In 2009, ECF
replaced PRGF to provide medium term lending to low income countries with a stronger
focus on priority spending and social safety net protection. Under the newly created
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, ECF demonstrates a better improvement from
PRGF. Although still in the limited years of implementation, ECF has shown much
stronger positive effect on growth than any of the previous longer term structural
adjustment programs. However, as years go by, more data will be produced to support or
reject this conclusion.
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Due to limited time and data, there are deficiencies within this research. The loan
disbursement variable is directly selected from the IMF Annual Report. In the reporting,
timing was not precisely accounted. It does not specify when the loan is disbursed in
different time of a fiscal year. This may provide bias in estimating the short term growth
effect. For example, the effect of growth in the next year from receiving a loan in January
the year before, must be essentially different from a loan disbursed in December the year
before. As stated in previous sections, it is ideal to evaluate the effect of IMF structural
adjustment programs in a long time span. However, due to data availability, long term
effect could not be fully evaluated. In Appendix, I did regression on growth effect 8, 9 10
years later after the initial disbursement, however, the newer programs, PRGF and ECF,
could not be fully accounted. It has been remarked that the World Bank has a significant
effect on growth and poverty reduction in the Sub-Saharan region. The growth of the
country maybe reflected from the IMF programs, as well as the World Bank programs. It
would be ideal to find accountable variables to control for the World Bank’s impact.
However, due to data limitation, I can only attribute it to the fixed effect, under the
assumption of it being consistent over the years. Lastly, as I indicated in the methodology
section, this paper chooses fixed effect regression to account for endogeneity. It is
effective only when the unobserved factors stay consistent and affect both growth and
participation. But there is a directly mutual relationship between growth and
participation, which is relied upon a set of accurate instrument variable methods.
Therefore, future research should improve upon these deficiencies and provide a more
reliable and viable examination on the growth effect from the IMF longer-term structural
adjustment programs.
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Appendix – Data Source and Definition
Variable

Data Source

Definition

PRGF

IMF Annual
Report

Dummy that equals one if PRGF is in effect
for at least 5 months in the year

PRGFamount

IMF Annual
Report

The amount of loan disbursed from PRGF
account to the country in the year

SAF

IMF Annual
Report

Dummy that equals one if SAF is in effect
for at least 5 months in the year

SAFAmount

IMF Annual
Report

The amount of loan disbursed from PRGF
account to the country in the year

ECF

IMF Annual
Report

Dummy that equals one if ECF is in effect
for at least 5 months in the year

ECFamount

IMF Annual
Report

The amount of loan disbursed from ECF
account to the country in the year

ESAF

IMF Annual
Report

Dummy that equals one if ESAF is in effect
for at least 5 months in the year

ESAFamount

IMF Annual
Report

The amount of loan disbursed from ESAF
account to the country in the year

growth

World Bank

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP based
on constant lobal currency

civilliberty

Freedom House

Rates civil liberties with 1 representing
the most free and 7 the least free

currentaccountpergdp

World Bank

Current account balance is the sum of net
exports of goods and services, net primary
income, and net secondary income, as a
percentage of GDP

democracy

Political IV,
Marshall and
Jaggers (2011)

0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy
score. Measures the general openness of
political institutions.

fertilityrate

World Bank

Represents the number of children that
would be born to a woman if she were to
live to the end of her childbearing years
and bear children in accordance with
prevailing age-specific fertility rates
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inflation

World Bank

Consumer price index in percent

inotherprogram

IMF Annual
Report

Dummy that equals one if SBA, EFF and/or
temporary program is in effect for at least 5
months in the year

lag_governmentconsumptionpergdp1

World Bank

All government current expenditures for
purchases of goods and services as a
percentage of GDP

lag_investment1

World Bank

Gross domestic investment as a percentage
of GDP

libor

IMF

London Inter-Bank Offer Rate on 6months deposits in the US dollar.

ln_lag_gdppercapita1

World Bank

GDP per capita is gross domestic product
divided by midyear population.

ln_quotasize

IMF

The country's quota size in the IMF in the
year

populationgrowth

World Bank

Annual population growth rate year by year

shorttermdebtpertotaldebt

World Bank

Short-term debt includes all debt having
an original maturity of one year or less
and interest in arrears on long-term debt.

totaldebtservicepergdp

World Bank

Total debt service is the sum of principal
repayments and interest actually

yearsmember

IMF

Years of membership in the IMF
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Appendix - Table 5 –Effect of IMF longer-term structural lending programs on
growth in 8, 9, 10 years

SAF
ESAF
PRGF
SAFAmount
ESAFamount
PRGFamount
inotherprogram
populationgrow
th
fertilityrate
ln_lag_gdpperc
apita1
lag_investment
1
lag_government
consumptionpe
rgdp1
inflation
libor
_cons
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

growth t+8
Robust Clustered
1
2
0.239
(0.822)
1.026
(0.723)
0.802
(0.758)
0.002
(0.008)
0.000
(0.002)
0.008
(0.007)
-0.39916
-0.684
(0.783)
(0.825)
-0.206
-0.204
(0.204)
(0.200)
-0.863
-0.940
(0.906)
(0.847)
-1.249
-1.266
(1.101)
(1.140)
-0.097
-0.091
(0.035)*** (0.034)***
0.200
0.204

growth t+9
Robust Clustered
1
2
-0.310
(0.656)
-0.252
(0.522)
-0.289
(0.509)
0.004
(0.010)
0.000
(0.002)
0.026
(0.025)
-0.282
-0.161
(0.880)
(0.900)
-0.047
-0.050
(0.263)
(0.273)
0.922
0.965
(0.937)
(0.912)
-1.216
-1.179
(1.237)
(1.194)
-0.155
-0.159
(0.081)*
(0.080)**
0.119
0.117

growth t+10
Robust Clustered
1
2
-0.217
(0.551)
-0.137
(0.559)
0.410
(0.519)
-0.002
(0.009)
0.003
(0.002)
0.032
(0.020)
0.578
0.700
(1.093)
(1.159)
-0.157
-0.153
(0.257)
(0.259)
0.047
0.069
(0.739)
(0.740)
-1.108
-1.095
(0.739)
(0.717)
-0.148
-0.150
(0.049)*** (0.048)***
0.239
0.239

(0.138)

(0.145)

(0.048)**

(0.046)**

(0.125)*

(0.123)*

-1.06E-12
(0.000)
0.193
(0.188)
14.911
(&.751)*
4.451
5.585
0.388

-6.07E-13
(0.000)
0.193
(0.182)
15.691
(7.700)**
4.501
5.596
0.393

-4.88E-11
(0.000)**
-0.116
(0.202)
9.178
(10.268)
5.064
5.035
0.503

-4.71E-11
(0.000)**
-0.0813
(0.205)
8.338
(9.743)
5.129
5.033
0.509

-1.46E-10
(0.000)***
-0.028
(0.194)
10.940
(6.371)*
4.818
4.906
0.491

-1.45E-10
(0.000)***
-0.009
(0.187)
10.455
(6.140)*
4.825
4.904
0.492
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